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Introduction: genetic diseases, genome editing 
and existing alternatives
Different reproductive options are available for couples or 
individuals at risk of transmitting genetic diseases to their 
offspring who wish to have children. In this paper, I explore 
ethical and social questions raised by the use of genome 
editing into the context of assisted reproduction and, in par-
ticular, as a potential alternative to preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD).
Some of the reproductive options available to this group 
of individuals include refraining from having geneti-
cally related children and/or using technologies to reduce 
or avoid the risk of transmission. The first set of options 
includes adopting existing children or turning to third-party 
reproduction (i.e. relying on a gamete donor). Adoption is 
currently legal in many European countries, but eligibil-
ity criteria vary. For instance, in some countries, access 
to this practice is limited to married heterosexual couples 
(e.g. Italy), while other countries have wider access criteria 
and allow same-sex couples (e.g. the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom) and single parents (e.g. France and the 
United Kingdom) to adopt. In addition, other criteria such 
as marital status and age play a role in the decision to grant 
adoption.
Another possibility to avoid transmission of genetic dis-
eases is for individuals to have partly genetically-related 
children and to seek gamete donors. This is commonly 
referred to as third-party reproduction, which allows cou-
ples to have children who are genetically related to a donor 
and to the unaffected individual in the couple. Third-party 
reproduction is currently only legal in some countries (e.g. 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain) and usu-
ally restricted to heterosexual couples. Moreover, the state 
Abstract This paper explores the ethics of introducing 
genome-editing technologies as a new reproductive option. 
In particular, it focuses on whether genome editing can be 
considered a morally valuable alternative to preimplan-
tation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Two arguments against 
the use of genome editing in reproduction are analysed, 
namely safety concerns and germline modification. These 
arguments are then contrasted with arguments in favour 
of genome editing, in particular with the argument of the 
child’s welfare and the argument of parental reproductive 
autonomy. In addition to these two arguments, genome 
editing could be considered as a worthy alternative to PGD 
as it may not be subjected to some of the moral critiques 
moved against this technology. Even if these arguments 
offer sound reasons in favour of introducing genome edit-
ing as a new reproductive option, I conclude that these ben-
efits should be balanced against other considerations. More 
specifically, I maintain that concerns regarding the equal-
ity of access to assisted reproduction and the allocation of 
scarce resources should be addressed prior to the adoption 
of genome editing as a new reproductive option.
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only subsidises IVF with donor gametes in a few countries 
(Gianaroli et al. 2016).
Alternatively, prospective parents at risk of transmitting 
genetic conditions to their offspring can seek to procreate 
with the aid of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) 
and preimplantation screening technologies (such as PGD), 
which would allow them to have genetically related chil-
dren free from the condition that affects them (or one of 
them). PGD allows the testing of embryos created with 
IVF for genetic abnormalities prior to their transfer in 
utero. This technology is currently legal in many European 
countries (Gianaroli et  al. 2016), but in some countries it 
remains restricted to so-called ‘serious’ conditions (e.g. 
in Italy and Germany), and in others is completely banned 
(e.g. in Poland and Switzerland; Biondi 2013; Gianaroli 
et al. 2016). Across Europe, eligibility criteria vary. In the 
United Kingdom, for instance, the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) periodically revises and 
updates the lists of conditions that are eligible for screen-
ing with PGD. Other countries, such as Germany and Italy, 
recently approved the use of PGD, but access to this prac-
tice remains restricted to a very limited number of severe, 
early onset conditions (Biondi 2013; Gianaroli et al. 2016).
PGD and assisted reproduction
Where PGD is legal, it is typically used in cases where 
both prospective parents are carriers of an autosomal 
recessive mutation. These mutations are responsible for 
the occurrence of autosomal recessive monogenic dis-
eases (i.e. diseases caused by a mutation in a single gene) 
such as cystic fibrosis and sickle cells anaemia.1 When 
both prospective parents are carriers of such mutations, 
future offspring have a 1 in 4 chance of inheriting the 
mutated gene and developing an autosomal recessive 
disease, while they have a 1 in 2 chance of inheriting 
one abnormal gene and thus becoming healthy carriers. 
PGD allows the testing and selection of embryos cre-
ated through IVF to transfer in utero those that are either 
free from the abnormal gene related to the prospective 
parents’ condition (or that are carriers of such mutated 
gene when no mutation-free embryo is obtained). PGD 
is also effective in cases where one of the prospective 
parents is heterozygous for an autosomal dominant muta-
tion, meaning that they carry two different variants of a 
gene. Autosomal dominant mutations are responsible 
for the occurrence of diseases such as Huntington’s and 
neurofibromatosis type 1. Future offspring have a 1 in 2 
chance of developing autosomal dominant diseases even 
if only one of the prospective parents is affected, because 
it is possible that the embryo would carry the ‘good’ 
genetic variant from both parents. If the embryo inherited 
the disease-causing variant from only one parent, how-
ever, the resulting child would be affected by the disease.
It could be the case that none of the embryos created 
through IVF is free from the undesirable genetic muta-
tion. For instance, when one of the prospective parents is 
homozygous for a dominant genetic disorder, the risk of 
transmission to offspring is as high as 100%, and hence 
no mutation-free embryos can be obtained. In addition, 
when prospective parents are both heterozygous for a 
dominant genetic disorder, the risk of transmission is as 
high as 75%, hence the chances of finding mutation-free 
embryos significantly low. Another case where PGD is 
not effective is when both parents are homozygous for a 
recessive genetic disorder, meaning that they both carry 
two variants of the disease-causing gene (Nuffield Coun-
cil on Bioethics 2016; Vassena et al. 2016). In such cases, 
genome editing could represent an alternative to PGD 
and a new reproductive option for some prospective par-
ents: mutations potentially leading to monogenic diseases 
would be corrected in embryos created with IVF prior to 
the transfer in utero or directly onto prospective parents’ 
gametes prior to fertilisation. Lastly, gene editing could 
replace PGD for women at risk of transmitting mitochon-
drial diseases as mitochondrial DNA mutations present in 
oocytes2 could be corrected in the embryo (Vassena et al. 
2016).
In the following section, I briefly present the debate on 
genome editing technologies applied to human embryos 
and I show how these technologies could be used as an 
alternative to PGD for the aforementioned cases where 
PGD is not effective. In “Assisted reproduction and PGD, 
or assisted reproduction and CRISPR?” section, I present 
the moral reasons in favour of and against introducing 
genome editing as an alternative to PGD. In particular, 
I present arguments in favour of using genome editing 
instead of, or as an alternative to, PGD, and argue that 
some of the moral arguments against PGD would not 
be applicable to genome editing. I conclude, ad interim, 
that such arguments offer a prima facie case in favour of 
introducing genome editing as a new reproductive option, 
given that safety concerns are thoroughly assessed. 
In “Curing embryos, society or prospective parents?” 
1 Autosomal recessive diseases develop when an individual has two 
copies of an abnormal gene.
2 Currently, the United Kingdom is the only country that has allowed 
mitochondrial DNA replacement techniques. Such techniques rep-
resent the only existing method for couples where one member is 
affected by a mitochondrial condition to have genetically related chil-
dren.
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section, I turn to other arguments on the ethics of intro-
ducing genome editing as a new reproductive option and 
argue that there are additional questions that need to be 
carefully addressed. I conclude that introducing genome 
editing in the context of assisted reproduction would have 
some benefits, but that concerns regarding the equality 
of access to assisted reproduction and the allocation of 
scarce resources should be addressed beforehand.
CRISPR and assisted reproduction
Gene-editing technologies have been around for over a dec-
ade. Zinc finger nucleases (ZFNs) and transcription acti-
vator-like effector nucleases (TALENs), two gene-editing 
technologies, were discovered in 2005 and 2010 respec-
tively (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2016). ZENs and 
TALENs are relatively precise techniques, but have the dis-
advantage that they need engineered proteins to target spe-
cific sequences of the DNA, a procedure that requires time 
and resources (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2016).
A new gene editing technique sparked debate early in 
2015 due to its application on non-viable human embryos 
by a group of Chinese scientists (Baltimore et  al. 2015; 
Lanphier and Urnov 2015). The technique in question 
is CRISPR/Cas9, an RNA-guided tool composed of two 
parts: clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic 
repeat (CRISPR) and CRISPR-associated protein 9 (Cas9). 
CRISPR/Cas9 makes use of a naturally occurring defence 
mechanism that bacteria use to avoid harmful infections 
caused by pathogenic organisms (e.g. viruses). The RNA 
tool (CRISPR) functions as a guide for the Cas proteins 
to target specific parts of the genome, which are subse-
quently cut by the Cas proteins. These cut strands can be 
exploited to modify the nucleotide sequence of DNA and 
to insert genes at the cut site. The application of this tech-
nique to human embryos and human gametes (i.e. oocytes 
and sperm cells) has been widely criticised for a number of 
issues, but chiefly for its potential to introduce inheritable 
changes in the human genome (germline modification). 
Indeed, the issue of germline modification has catalysed 
the attention of many scientists and ethicists (Brokowski 
et al. 2015; Lander 2015; Lanphier and Urnov 2015).
This paper focuses on PGD and CRISPR3 applications 
to the field of assisted reproduction. In particular, it focuses 
on CRISPR as a potential alternative to PGD. CRISPR 
could represent a tool to avoid the occurrence of genetic 
diseases in future children through the modification of the 
genetic makeup of embryos created with IVF from couples 
with a known risk of transmitting such genetic diseases. 
Since using CRISPR on early embryos could give to pro-
spective parents who are either affected by monogenic 
diseases or who are carriers of them a chance to avoid the 
transmission of these diseases to their offspring, this par-
ticular application of CRISPR can be considered a new 
reproductive option for parents who want to have geneti-
cally related children.
Assisted reproduction and PGD, or assisted 
reproduction and CRISPR?
Research on human embryos with CRISPR technology is 
still at an early stage and only few experiments have been 
carried out thus far (Vassena et  al. 2016). Despite this, 
the issue of allowing clinical research has been discussed 
recently (Gyngell et  al. 2016; Vassena et  al. 2016; Reyes 
and Lanner 2017). The two main precautionary reasons that 
have been advanced against clinical applications of genome 
editing on human embryos or gamete cells are concerns 
regarding introducing changes in the human germline and 
safety questions. Many scholars and members of the public 
consider germline modifications unethical and a “line that 
should not be crossed” (Collins 2015; for a discussion of 
this claim, see: Camporesi and Cavaliere 2016). The worry 
is that edited embryos will pass their edited genome on to 
future generations, thus introducing changes in humanity’s 
gene pool. While it is of fundamental moral importance to 
consider the impact of present actions that could potentially 
have an impact on future generations, it seems reductive to 
limit these precautionary reflections to changes introduced 
with genome editing technologies on reproductive cells 
and embryos. In particular, those who worry about ger-
mline modifications via CRISPR and other genome editing 
technologies maintain that there is something exceptional 
in changes introduced technologically in our genomes via 
genome editing (and indirectly into the genomes of our 
offspring). The worry about germline modification encom-
passes a number of concerns, including the view that the 
human genome should be preserved intact as a “common 
heritage of our humanity” (cf. UNESCO statement against 
cloning, UNESCO 1997); the view that would be ethi-
cally problematic to change the germline of future genera-
tions “without their consent” (Collins 2015); and concerns 
regarding the safety of the technique not only for the child 
born thanks to its aid, but also for the child’s children (more 
about this below and in “Reproductive autonomy, child 
welfare and the interests of society” section). This first view 
misrepresents partially the natural history of humankind 
and how past and present humanly introduced innovations 
3 The arguments made for CRISPR can be extended also to other 
future genome editing technologies. Throughout the paper, I use 
CRISPR and genome editing or gene editing technologies inter-
changeably.
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shape future generations (Buchanan 2011; Harris 1992). 
The introduction of agriculture, for instance, played a role 
not only in shaping our environment, but has fundamen-
tally changed our genomes. The same could be said about 
technologies such as literacy and numeracy, which laid the 
foundations for technological innovations that have signifi-
cantly changed us (Buchanan 2008, 2011). In other words, 
from a moral point of view, it seems irrelevant which means 
are used and whether inheritable changes are introduced 
with genome editing technologies or caused by other tech-
nological innovations, unless one is able to show the moral 
exceptionality of using genome editing technologies (Har-
ris 2010). In addition to this, focusing solely on technical 
means to introduce changes the human gene pool overlooks 
how other policies (such as those dealing with greenhouse 
gas mitigation), innovations (such as those in the field of 
agriculture) and human habits could have similar effects 
(i.e. introduce changes in the gene pool) with potentially 
much more serious consequences (Dupras et al. 2014). The 
view that emphasises the need to ask the consent of future 
generations, as argued by Harris (2016), fails to state how 
such consent could be obtained. Most procreative decisions 
affect future generations, but it is unclear how and why the 
consent of future offspring should be obtained prior to act 
(Harris 2016).
The other argument against allowing genome editing for 
clinical uses is concern for the safety of future offspring 
(and of this offspring’s offspring). At this stage, safety is 
indeed an issue and the efficiency of genome editing on 
embryos remains low, with mosaic embryos (i.e. embryos 
that have abnormal numbers of chromosomes in certain 
cells resulting in genetically different cells coexisting in the 
same organism) being the main known drawback of these 
technologies (Vassena et al. 2016). Despite this, some stud-
ies have proven the feasibility of gene editing in animals 
(Heo et  al. 2014; Shao et  al. 2014; Yoshimi et  al. 2014; 
Zou et al. 2015), even though the efficiency of genetically 
modifying zygotes with Cas9 ranges between 0.5 and 40% 
(Araki and Ishii 2014). In addition, a recent study demon-
strated the feasibility of preventing the onset of a genetic 
disorder such as cataract development (Wu et al. 2013) and 
the injection of Cas9 into primate zygotes led to the birth 
of genetically modified offspring (Liu et al. 2014; Niu et al. 
2014).
The case for genome editing: two sets of arguments
There are two sets of arguments for introducing CRISPR 
and other gene editing technologies into the clinic, pro-
vided that safety concerns are properly addressed. In this 
section I first outline the first group of arguments, which 
concerns the benefits of genome editing for future chil-
dren (and their children too) and for prospective parents 
(Gyngell et al. 2016; Reyes and Lanner 2017). In the fol-
lowing section, I present additional reasons why genome 
editing could be a morally preferable alternative to PGD: 
genome editing would not be subjected to some of the 
critiques moved against PGD.
The moral reasons that ground the case for PGD (the 
welfare of future children and the reproductive autonomy 
of prospective parents. Pennings et  al. 2007; Buchanan 
et  al. 2001; Harris 1992) can be extended to defend 
the clinical use of genome editing in reproduction. It is 
widely accepted that reproductive autonomy and respect 
for parental discretion in reproduction are values worth 
defending4 (Buchanan et  al. 2001; Harris 1992; Rob-
ertson 1996). With respect to reproductive autonomy, 
genome editing would be comparatively better than PGD: 
it would offer an alternative to this technology for those 
aforementioned cases where PGD is not effective or for 
prospective parents who wish to increase their chances 
of having mutation-free embryos. In this sense, genome 
editing could be said to enhance reproductive autonomy. 
With respect to the welfare of the child, the case in favour 
of genome editing seems prima facie stronger than the 
case in favour of PGD. Unlike the latter technology, 
whereby embryos implanted can be carriers of the par-
ents’ mutated gene, genome editing would allow modifi-
cation of the genetic makeup of embryos who would con-
sequently develop into mutation-free offspring. In other 
words, genome editing would prevent the occurrence 
of genetic diseases in future generations, while PGD 
can sometimes only prevent the occurrence of genetic 
diseases in the child that develops from the implanted 
embryo (Gyngell et al. 2016).
There are, however, other arguments in favour of pre-
ferring genome editing to PGD. PGD is a contested prac-
tice as its scopes are not therapeutic (i.e. PGD does not 
treat embryos) but rather selective (i.e. PGD selects the 
embryos that should be transferred in utero. Asch and 
Barlevy 2012; Parens and Asch 2003). PGD as a means 
to select embryos that have a decreased risk of develop-
ing into a child with a genetic condition is seen as ethi-
cally troubling for two reasons: firstly, because it goes 
against the traditional ends of medicine and ‘selects out’ 
rather than ‘cures’ persons affected by genetic conditions 
(MacKellar and Bechtel 2014), and secondly, because 
decisions on which embryos should be selected are said 
to embody value judgements regarding people living with 
certain disabilities (Knoppers et al. 2006; Parens and Ash 
2003), a critique of screening technologies that became 
4 At least when it is about medical conditions, but this is the case in 
question, so I will not enter into a discussion on so-called cosmetic 
traits and enhancement.
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known as the ‘expressivist argument’ or ‘expressivist 
objection’ (Buchanan 1996; Shakespeare 2006).
Selection versus therapy
PGD (at the moment) and CRISPR (potentially in the future) 
are two technologies that enable similar ends: in both cases, 
these technologies increase the chances of giving parents 
genetically related offspring unaffected by specific genetic 
conditions. Despite the similarity of the outcomes (i.e. 
healthy child), the means used are rather different. PGD is 
a form of genetic testing that allows screening for abnor-
malities in early embryos and to subsequently implant only 
those with a decreased risk of developing a certain condition. 
Instead, CRISPR and other gene editing technologies are 
tools for gene therapy that allow the modification of embryos 
or of gamete cells in order to avoid the occurrence of certain 
conditions in the future child (and in future generations).
Following this distinction of means, there is a sense that 
while PGD entails the selection of embryos, CRISPR is 
more akin to therapy. At this point, however, it is important 
to note that CRISPR and other genome editing technologies 
can be considered both therapeutic and non-strictly-thera-
peutic (or, following Wrigley et al. “pre-emptively therapeu-
tic”; Wrigley et al. 2015, p. 636). I am not trying to violate 
Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction on the impossibil-
ity that contradictory assertions can be both true at the same 
time here. What I mean is rather that whether these tech-
nologies are therapeutic depends on what sort of factual and 
moral considerations are taken into account. If the focus is 
on the prospective parents, then CRISPR can be considered 
therapeutic in some instances because it could be a solution 
(or a treatment?) for those couples who would not otherwise 
be able to conceive children that are related to them and that 
are free from the risk of developing (or have a decreased 
risk to develop) the condition that affects them.
If the focus is on the future children, we have two pos-
sible interpretations: following the view that equates 
embryos with persons, CRISPR is therapeutic because it 
treats the embryos (i.e. it treats persons), whereas PGD is 
selective because it selects in/out the embryos (i.e. it selects 
out persons). If, however, we are more inclined to think of 
embryos as beings with the potential to develop into per-
sons (i.e. potentiality view, arguably a more widely shared 
position), then CRISPR is not straightforwardly therapeu-
tic, because there is no person to be treated at the moment 
that we use the technology.5 Despite this remark, I argue 
that there is a sense whereby genome editing can still be 
considered therapeutic, or, as mentioned above, pre-emp-
tively therapeutic. In order to assess whether CRISPR can 
be considered pre-emptively therapeutic, it is necessary to 
determine whether embryo X (i.e. the embryo that exist 
prior to the application of CRISPR) is identical to new-
born  X+ about 9 months (i.e. the child that is born after the 
application of CRISPR on embryo X). This assessment 
matters for the ethical debate on PGD and genome edit-
ing because if these two entities (embryo X and new-born 
 X+ about 9 months) are identical, then PGD would be more 
problematic than CRISPR as the first would be a selective 
technology, whereas the second would be a therapeutic 
technology. A brief explanation of the question of identity 
is needed before proceeding with the discussion on PGD 
and CRISPR and the ethics thereof. Currently, ethicists and 
philosophers involved in the debate on reproductive genetic 
technologies seem to be divided on whether genome edit-
ing technologies applied to embryos are identity-affecting 
technologies or not, as this largely depends on the circum-
stances taken into account.6 When I say “identity-affecting” 
I refer to the idea of numerical identity and to the meta-
physical problem of determining how we can rightly refer 
to one and the same person in any different set of circum-
stances, despite the changes that the person undergoes 
over time. Thus, for instance, there is numerical identity 
between a person X and a person Y only if person X and 
Y are the same person. To put it simply, I am numeri-
cally identical to the person that is writing this paper at the 
moment. The challenge of any account of numerical iden-
tity is then to explain what determines the entity that we 
in fact are despite the changes that we undergo over time. 
5 This observation is conditional as it relies on the interpretation of 
therapy as a practice that can only be defined as such if there is a per-
son to be treated (Rulli 2016a).
6 I refer here to the debate on mitochondrial replacement techniques 
(MRTs) and not strictly on genome editing with CRISPR, as few 
commentators have dealt specifically with the question of whether 
genome editing is identity-affecting (for two examples, see: Gyngell 
et  al. 2016; Liao 2017). One of the two techniques for the replace-
ment of faulty mitochondrial DNA, pronuclear transfer (PNT), argu-
ably represents the most similar case to genome editing as, unlike the 
other technique for the replacement of mitochondrial DNA (maternal 
spindle transfer—MST), it is applied after the oocytes has been fer-
tilised. The contention, in the case of PNT, is whether this technique 
is identity-affecting or not, and commentators have presented differ-
ing views on this matter (Liao 2017; Palacio-González 2017; Rulli 
2016a; Wrigley et al. 2015). While I am aware that PNT and CRISPR 
are two distinct technologies, PNT arguably represents the most simi-
lar case to genome editing as both CRISPR and PNT are applied after 
fertilisation. Hence, other things being equal, arguments concerning 
whether PNT is identity-affecting or not can also be considered valid 
in discussions on whether CRISPR is identity-affecting. It must be 
noted however, that those who explicitly referred to genome editing 
maintained that it is not identity-affecting (Gyngell et al. 2016; Liao 
2017). Interestingly, authors who speculatively consider the possibil-
ity of using gene therapy on human embryos before the availability 
of CRISPR are also divided on this issue (Buchanan 1996; McMahan 
2006; Sparrow 2008).
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In this sense, if I grow taller or if I lose an eye due to an 
accident, I am still numerically identical to the entity I was 
before having that accident or when I was shorter. This is 
the case because changes such as losing an eye or growing 
taller are largely considered contingent to numerical iden-
tity, namely they do not change the entity that I am.
Returning to genome editing, those who do not subscribe 
to the embryos as persons view can view the technology 
in two different ways. The contentious matter is whether 
applying CRISPR on embryo X creates a numerically dif-
ferent entity (call it embryo Z, that will eventually develop 
into person Z) or it just leads to a numerically identical 
entity (call it embryo X*, that will eventually develop into 
person X*) in the same sense that applying gene therapy on 
adult X does not create a different adult Z, but only leads 
to a numerically identical adult X*. While in the first case 
genome editing would be considered an identity-affecting 
technology (i.e. a technology that by virtue of its use cre-
ates an entirely new entity), in the second case it would 
amount to a non-identity-affecting technology.7 Following 
the first interpretation, CRISPR cannot be considered a 
therapy as, by virtue of its use on an embryo, it determines 
the kind of person that is brought into being rather than 
pre-emptively curing the same pre-person. On the contrary, 
if we are inclined to follow the second interpretation, then 
CRISPR is therapeutic as it pre-emptively cures an embryo 
that will develop into a numerically identical child that does 
not have the genetic condition that is consciously avoided.8 
It is only in this second sense that it is possible to say that if 
the genome of an embryo affected by a certain genetic con-
dition is modified and this condition eradicated, then this 
embryo will develop into a numerically identical child who, 
had CRISPR not been used, would have been affected by 
a genetic disease. As a consequence, even if one does not 
subscribe to the embryo-as-persons view, there is a sense 
whereby genome editing can be considered at least more 
similar to therapy than to selection: genome editing would 
be a pre-emptive treatment for the genetic disease that is 
caused by the genetic mutation at the embryonic stage.
If the second interpretation about genome editing being 
non-identity-affecting is embraced, then both the teleologi-
cal objection (i.e. PGD is morally problematic because it 
does not fall within the traditional ends of medicine) and 
the selective attitudes objection (i.e. PGD is morally prob-
lematic because it promotes selective and discriminatory 
attitudes) seem to be less applicable to the use of genome 
editing on embryos to prevent the occurrence of certain 
conditions in future children. As explained above, editing 
the genome of embryos can be considered pre-emptively 
therapeutic and thus falls within (or at least closer to) the 
traditional ends of medicine. From this, it also follows that 
it would be problematic to consider such practice as selec-
tive or discriminatory: disability scholars would have to 
condemn all the interventions aimed at treating genetic dis-
eases (Barnes 2014).
These clarifications have normative implications, 
namely that, once the safety of editing the genome of 
human embryos is carefully assessed, the latter technol-
ogy should be considered preferable to PGD. In the next 
section, I will outline some additional questions that need 
to be addressed and explain why preferring CRISPR over 
PGD is not completely cost-free.
Curing embryos, society or prospective parents?
In the previous sections, two main questions have remained 
unaddressed. One question is on the value and meaning of 
genetic parenthood. Another, albeit related, question con-
cerns the ethics of existing alternatives. I explore these two 
questions in this last section and conclude that they pro-
vide at least some prima facie moral reasons for carefully 
7 Despite some challenges, the biological origin (or gametic origin) 
that a person has is widely considered a necessary condition of what 
determines the human being that we are. This is well explained by 
philosopher Derek Parfit’s ‘Origin View’ (or gametic essentialism): 
“each person has this necessary property: that of having grown from 
the particular pair of cells from which this person in fact grew” (Parfit 
1984, p. 353). In other words, the fact that two gametes came together 
and generated me is, under this view, considered a necessary condi-
tion of my identity: I am the entity that I am by virtue of my gametic 
origin. Now, this is linked to the discussion of treatment and selec-
tion because a technology such as PGD is identity-affecting. In other 
words, using PGD causes a numerically different person to come 
into being, namely a different person than the person that would have 
come into being had PGD not been used. In the case of genome edit-
ing, since the intervention takes place after fertilisation, the gametic 
origin of the genetically modified embryo and the gametic origin of 
the non-genetically modified embryos are identical. In other words, 
these two embryos are numerically identical. The contention, how-
ever, is that gametic origin is only a necessary and not sufficient 
condition for having a specific identity. Thus, whether genome edit-
ing technologies applied to zygotes/embryos cause a different person 
to come into being or not remains an open question. If they do, then 
such technologies cannot be considered therapeutic because a differ-
ent person comes into being due to the use of genome editing. If they 
do not, they can be considered therapeutic.
8 If genome editing is employed before the 14th day after fertilisa-
tion (as it is required by embryos research regulations in the United 
Kingdom and in many other countries, Hyun et al. 2016), the embryo 
could still cleave into two (i.e. twinning). In this case, the children 
that could potentially develop from such embryo will be two. How-
ever, twinning occurs spontaneously and it is not influenced by the 
use of genome editing on the embryo. As a consequence, the use of 
the technique does not directly affect the numerical identity of the 
future child/children as it is not the direct causation of the embryo 
splitting.
Footnote 8 (continued)
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considering the introduction of a new reproductive option 
when similar options are already available.
A peculiar feature of assisted reproductive technologies 
such as PGD, and possibly genome editing, is that they 
are often offered to prospective parents who are affected 
by a genetic condition in order to conceive (or increase 
their chances of conceiving) healthy offspring. It is in this 
sense that these technologies represent a solution for those 
prospective parents whose problem is the impossibility of 
having a genetically related and healthy child; or at least 
healthier than the child that would otherwise be brought 
into the world had these technologies not be employed. As 
explained in the first section of this paper, there are other 
options than PGD to increase the chances of having healthy 
children, but they entail refraining from having genetically 
related children (for one individual in the couple or, in the 
case of adoption, both parties). Reproductive technologies 
such as PGD and genome editing convey the interests of 
different groups: the prospective parents, the future off-
spring and the society where these offspring will grow and 
thrive. Despite the importance of all three stakeholders, 
their interests are not granted equal importance: the welfare 
of future children and the reproductive autonomy of the 
prospective parents are usually considered of greater moral 
importance than the aggregate interests of society in having 
healthy members, respecting competing values on assisted 
reproduction, and limiting the use of certain technologies 
against a backdrop of scarce resources. This is what I define 
as the received view on the ethics of assisted reproductive 
technologies. An ethical assessment of whether introducing 
new technologies in the context of reproduction should thus 
consider these three aspects (with the aforementioned pri-
oritisation in mind) in turn.
Reproductive autonomy, child welfare and the interests 
of society
Genome editing, at first sight, seems to score high on the 
reproductive autonomy and welfare of the child fronts: 
unlike PGD, it allows for more conditions to be corrected 
and the reduction of the occurrence of certain genetic con-
ditions in future generations; it also increases the reproduc-
tive autonomy of the parents by offering not only one more 
possibility in the geneticists tool-box, but also by allowing 
those couples for whom PGD is not always successful to 
have biologically related, healthy offspring. So far so good. 
Or maybe not? The idea that more choice leads to greater 
freedom has been challenged (Dworkin 1982; Rose 1999; 
Rothman 1985). More options can also translate into more 
uncertainties, and greater perceived and actual responsi-
bilities for the prospective parents (Dworkin 1982). In this 
sense, introducing genome editing into the clinic as an 
alternative to PGD may be detrimental for the very same 
prospective parents that it is designed for. While genome 
editing may be more routinely employed in the future, 
some issues will likely remain. These issues include, for 
instance, reflections upon which conditions should be eligi-
ble for the use of genome editing and whether parents who 
fail to employ the most efficient technology available could 
be considered morally responsible (Rothman 1985).
What about the welfare of the future child? The empiri-
cal question of whether safety concerns will be put to rest 
and genome editing will ever be safe enough to represent 
a concrete alternative to PGD divides scholars (Harris 
2016). The reasons for this are twofold: first, no one knows 
the answer to such questions yet. Secondly, this empirical 
question is strongly influenced by the value judgements of 
scientists, ethicists, policy-makers and the public on the 
degree of certainty required to move forward. Hence, even 
without denying that such empirical questions will be even-
tually be put to rest, it is still important to note that a con-
sensus on the question of safety will be hard to reach due to 
the competing values at stake in stakeholders’ assessments. 
Those taking a precautionary stance concerning technolog-
ical development will favour existing technologies over the 
newly discovered, while those who are generally in favour 
of technological development will be ready to accept a 
higher degree of risk in the name of such progress and of 
the potential benefits that it may yield. With respect to the 
safety and the welfare of the future child, whether genome 
editing really represents a better option than PGD will thus 
divide scholars, scientists and the public (and, as exem-
plified by the debate on embryo-applications of CRISPR, 
already does). A decision on whether to allow genome edit-
ing will thus have to rest not only on a thorough assess-
ment of the safety of the techniques, but also on a demo-
cratic process that takes into account such differing views 
and values (Cavaliere 2017; Jasanoff et  al. 2015; Kitcher 
2001). The ethical assessment of new techniques ought to 
not only rest on a cost/benefit analysis, but also on an eval-
uation of existing alternatives, including those that do not 
rely on biomedical means. In other words, whether genome 
editing really represents a worthy alternative to existing 
options (such as PGD) depends on the extent to which the 
welfare of the future child can be put at risk to allow cou-
ples to have a genetically related child. Regulators and ethi-
cists that argue in favour of eventually replacing PGD with 
genome editing, and couples for whom PGD does not rep-
resent an option, will have to consider whether reproduc-
tive autonomy should trump questions on the welfare of the 
child in light of uncertainty.
Lastly, what role should societal interests and views play 
in the decision over whether genome editing should replace 
PGD? There are different ways in which assisted reproduc-
tive technologies and procreative decisions more generally 
impinge on society. Procreative decisions influence the type 
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and the number of people that will be created. They allow 
new consumers, producers, workers, mothers, fathers, 
etc. to come into existence. We live in an increasingly 
interlinked world and the aggregate effects of individual 
decisions affect a wider range of people than ever before 
(Singer 2004). There are historical reasons why third par-
ties’ interventions in procreation are looked at with suspi-
cion, and the shadow of eugenics seems to extend over any 
discussion regarding reproductive technologies and their 
governance (Paul 1992). Despite these worries, the regula-
tion of new reproductive technologies will be influenced by 
governments’ policies, which in turn will reflect the inter-
ests of society and societal views on emerging reproduc-
tive technologies. Regarding the governance of genome 
editing technologies and their potential use in the context 
of assisted reproduction, the interests of society might 
play a role in two main ways: the first is whether genome 
editing is ethically acceptable for a large segment of soci-
ety (Kitcher 2001), and second, related, is whether exist-
ing alternatives warrant the introduction of a new practice 
and the clinical research necessary to safely implement it. 
Almost every new technology introduced or discussed for 
potential introduction in reproduction seems to stir contro-
versies. The recent debates on genome editing (Camporesi 
and Cavaliere 2016), mitochondrial replacement techniques 
(Appleby 2015) and ‘older’ debates on PGD (Scott 2006) 
are just a few instances of these controversies. However, 
once certain uses are constrained and lines drawn (for 
instance between therapeutic and enhancing uses), these 
technologies have been approved and, at least in certain 
countries, accepted by large swaths of the population. Thus, 
even if genome editing will be met with controversies and 
will encounter resistance, it does not prima facie translate 
into the need for banning any research involving it. On the 
contrary, this should translate into support for a democratic 
and deliberative approach to the governance of technologi-
cal innovation (Jasanoff et al. 2015) and into the respecting 
of competing moral views on these issues (Cavaliere 2017).
Societal interests and the costs of introducing genome 
editing in the context of assisted reproduction
At this point, there is, however, there is one last thing to 
consider, which concerns the aforementioned interests 
of society and how they should and could play a role in 
the ethical assessment of introducing genome editing in 
the context of assisted reproduction. While it is true that 
genome editing could open up new reproductive possibili-
ties for certain couples (i.e. enhance reproductive auton-
omy) and provide heritable benefits to their future offspring 
(i.e. considerations regarding the welfare of future child), 
these benefits ought to be balanced against the costs of 
introducing a new reproductive technology. These costs 
include the investment of public resources, considering 
both the scarcity of such resources and the existence of 
available alternatives. Emanuel et al. (2000) argue that for 
clinical research to be ethical, among other requirements, it 
needs to have social value, namely it should be directed at 
“a diagnostic and therapeutic intervention that could lead 
to improvements in health and well-being” (Emanuel et al. 
2000). Being of social value is an ethical requirement for 
clinical research to go forward precisely because it oper-
ates in a context of scarce resources. From this it follows 
that if the social value of a technology is limited, then the 
investment of public resources for the development and 
implementation of such technology may be unethical (Rulli 
2016b). The proposed clinical research (in this case that 
needed in order to implement genome editing as an alter-
native to PGD) needs to be evaluated on two levels: abso-
lute and relative. The absolute level is settled once the pro-
posed research is expected to bring about improvements to 
health and well-being. The relative level, however, needs 
more: the proposed research (and the improvements to 
health and well-being thereof) needs to be compared both 
with other potential uses of those scarce resources and with 
existing alternatives to bring about similar improvements 
to health and well-being. Two of the criteria that are often 
employed to assess whether to invest resources in certain 
clinical research and whether it will bring about significant 
improvements to health and well-being are the severity of 
the condition and the number of individuals that it affects 
(Rulli 2016b). If we consider these two criteria, the benefits 
of the introduction of genome editing as a new reproduc-
tive option are arguably minor and thus may not warrant 
the investment of public resources. The number of cases 
for which PGD is not an option, as mentioned in the first 
section, is limited. In addition, considering the importance 
of taking into account future children’s welfare, the unre-
solved questions concerning safety seem to indicate that 
health improvements may not be so significant. An obvious 
critique to this is the following: clinical research is aimed 
at improving techniques in order to achieve significant 
benefits for future children. This is certainly correct and 
we would not enjoy the benefits of many technologies and 
drugs if it was not for clinical research. But again: resources 
are limited and not all research can be publicly funded.
Returning to the relative level to evaluate clinical 
research, it is important to consider that improvements in 
the health and well-being of future children can also be 
achieved by looking at alternative solutions, for instance 
third party reproduction or adoption. For those limited 
number of parents for whom PGD is not an option, the 
choice is not between genome editing and a sick child. The 
choice is much wider than that. This does not mean that the 
choice of adopting or relying on third party reproduction 
comes without a cost, or that prospective parents’ wishes 
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should be neglected. It only means that there are other 
interests at stake and that there are other strategies than 
developing new technologies to tackle health needs.
These considerations do not lead to the conclusion that 
public interest (in the form of a prudent use of resources) 
should be prioritised over prospective parents’ reproduc-
tive autonomy and future offspring’s welfare. On the con-
trary, the received view, namely the view that considers 
the interests of these two groups as more morally relevant 
than those of society, ought to be taken as the default posi-
tion. But this position should not prevent us from seeking 
alternatives. Perfecting existing technologies such as PGD, 
and possibly widening the criteria of access to adoption or 
third party reproduction, would be a less costly and possi-
bly quicker strategy to grant future children’s welfare while 
at the same time respecting prospective parents’ wishes. 
Making existing technologies and practices available via 
broader state funding schemes would allow their use by 
larger swaths of the population.
Conclusions: context matters
In this article, I have analysed the moral case for introduc-
ing genome editing as an alternative to PGD. I have pre-
sented the reasons in favour and the two main arguments 
against this possibility, namely safety and germline modifi-
cations. After presenting some of the available data on the 
safety of CRISPR, I have argued that concerns with ger-
mline modifications do not represent a compelling argu-
ment against the introduction of genome editing into the 
clinic. I have then turned to arguments in favour of genome 
editing and concluded that there seems to be a prima facie 
case in favour of starting clinical research with CRISPR. 
In the last section, I have focused on the moral reasons that 
are normally taken into account in debates on reproductive 
technologies, namely the welfare of future children, the 
reproductive autonomy of the parents and the interests of 
society. I have showed that a closer look at genome edit-
ing in light of these moral reasons seems to generate some 
additional reasons for caution in accepting genome editing 
as a new reproductive option. These reasons may entail 
shifting from funding new resources, such as CRISPR, and 
advocating for its introduction in the name of values such 
as reproductive autonomy and the welfare of future chil-
dren, to focusing on widening the criteria of access to exist-
ing options and possibly re-thinking resource allocation 
and state funding of assisted reproduction. This paper does 
not attempt to provide decisive arguments in favour of or 
against the introduction of CRISPR as a new reproductive 
option. As many have argued, it may be too soon to have 
a conclusive assessment of this possibility, if only for the 
dearth of empirical data regarding its safety and feasibility. 
Rather, this paper offers a basis to begin a discussion on 
the ethics of introducing genome editing as an alternative 
to PGD and stresses the need to consider that scientific 
research does not happen in a vacuum where the soundest 
theoretical argument wins. Rather, it happens in a context 
where resources are limited, where genetic parenthood is 
an important value cherished by many, and where technical 
solutions are often given preference over other strategies.
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